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CONTRACT LAW-INTERPRETATION OF "UNITED
STATES"-EIGHTH CIRCUIT HOLDS THAT
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT FOR "UNITED STATES"
TRAVEL AGENTS EXCLUDES AFFECTED AGENTS IN
PUERTO RICO AND THE U.S. VIRGIN ISLANDS:
AMERICAN SOCIETY OF TRAVEL AGENTS
V. UNITED AIRLINES, INC.
LINDSAY M. GERMANO*
W TH THE revolution of the Internet, we have quickly seen
the death of the travel agent. The nostalgic time of con-
tacting your travel agent to obtain discounted fares has been re-
placed with a variety of airline sponsored Internet specials. As a
result, major airlines have virtually eliminated commissions paid
to travel agents for travel within the continental United States,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, thereby
obliterating the travel agency industry.' Consequently, the
American Society of Travel Agents (ASTA) spearheaded a class
action against the airlines alleging violations of antitrust princi-
ples.2 The suit was settled just prior to trial, with an $86 million
settlement fund to be distributed to those class members af-
fected by the commission reduction.'
During the disbursement of the funds, however, several issues
arose regarding the class's definition and the proper allocation
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2004; B.A., Rice University, cum laude, 2001. The author would like to thank her
family, friends, the attorneys involved, and all of the SMULRA editorial staff for
their support and guidance in the publication of this note.
1 Lisa Eckelbecker, Ticket to Ruin; Travel Agents Miss Airlines' Commissions, TELE-
GRAM & GAZETTE (Worcester, MA), Mar. 27, 2002, at E1;James Ott, TravelAgents
Gird for New Fee Caps, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Sept. 3, 2001, at 82.
2 Ott, supra note 1, at 82. Recently, ASTA also asked the U.S. Government to
provide limited antitrust immunity to allow agents to conduct collective bargain-
ing with the airlines. Id.
3 In re Am. Soc'y of Travel Agents v. United Airlines, Inc., 268 F.3d 619, 621
(8th Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Travel Agents].
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of the funds.4 Recently, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the exclusion of travel agents in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands from the class, despite both the agencies' and air-
lines' belief that they were included in the settlement.5 Accord-
ingly, by excluding Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands from
the class action's definition of "United States," the court used a
definition in direct contrast to the parties' intent and severely
limited the extent to which a party can define the terms of its
agreements.
Beginning in 1995, the major airlines6 reduced the commis-
sions paid to travel agents for all travel that was "issued by U.S.
travel agents for travel within and between the continental U.S.,
Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands."7 The
reduction applied to travel agencies in the continental United
States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.8
Because the airlines have essentially eliminated an agent's ability
to function, numerous travel agencies brought antitrust class ac-
tion suits against the airlines alleging violations of the Sherman
Act.9 In addition, ASTA, an organization that represents over
16,000 independent travel agencies in the continental United
States, Hawaii, Alaska, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
brought suit on behalf of its members. 10 Due to the cases' simi-
larity, the judicial panel on multi-district litigation consolidated
the cases and transferred them to the United States District
Court for the District of Minnesota." The suits were certified as
a class action, with the court defining the class as "[a]ll travel
agencies in the United States who at any time from February 10,
1995, to the present, issues tickets.. .for any travel on any of the
defendant airlines within and between the continental United
States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.' 12
Just prior to trial, the district court approved a settlement with
the defendant airlines and created a settlement fund of approx-
4 Id.
5 Id. at 623.
6 The major airlines included were: Delta Airlines, United Airlines, Inc., Amer-
ican Airlines, Inc., Continental Airlines, Inc., Northwest Airlines, Inc., and USAir,
Inc. Id. at 619.
7 Id. at 620.
8 Id.
9 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2002); Travel Agents, 268 F.3d at 621.
10 Travel Agents, 268 F.3d at 621.
11 Id.
12 Id.
TRAVEL AGENTS V. UNITED AIRLINES
imately $86 million. 13 To disburse the funds, ASTA provided
the airlines with a list of travel agencies to inform them of the
settlement and to discuss a method of disbursement.14 Unfortu-
nately, the company that provided the list of agencies to ASTA
only provided domestic data, and as a result, information re-
garding the suit was only mailed to travel agencies in the fifty
states and the District of Columbia.15 However, "a summary no-
tice of the settlement was posted electronically on the airlines
computer reservation system and reprinted in several trade pub-
lications," thereby reaching agencies in Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. 6 Despite the electronic notification to
these agents, settlement checks were only mailed or wire trans-
ferred to travel agencies in the fifty states and the District of
Columbia, and nearly $600,000 was left unclaimed in the fund.17
Then, in February 1998, a Puerto Rican travel agency filed a
class action antitrust suit against the airlines asserting additional
violations of the Sherman Act.18 In this suit, the class members
alleged that they were not included in the 1995 suit because
they were international travel agencies and were governed by
the International Travel Agents Network.1 9 Ironically, the air-
lines asserted that the Puerto Rican travel agents were, in fact,
class members in the 1995 consolidated cases and in December
1998, the parties stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of the suit
with prejudice. z
In June 1999, ASTA, with the support of the airlines, filed a
motion to clarify the class definition for the airlines' settlement
agreement with the district court. 21 ASTA asserted that the Pu-
erto Rican and Virgin Islands agencies were involved in the orig-
inal class definition. 22 Liaison class counsel opposed ASTA's
motion and asserted that the class definition specifically ex-







19 Id. at 622-23.
20 Id. at 622.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Liaison class counsel also requested a cy pres distribution of the unclaimed
funds to several Minnesota charities and Minnesota law school scholarships. Id.
at 623.
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tion to clarify, holding that the plain and ordinary meaning of
"United States" did not include Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin
Islands, and that the plaintiffs did not intend for the class to
include agents in those locations.24 Since there were two refer-
ences to the term "United States," the court found that the first
reference to "United States" referred only to the location of the
class members, while the second reference to "United States"
was to the location of the affected travel. 25 Under this interpre-
tation, the first reference did not include Puerto Rico and the
Virgin Islands, but the second one did.26 Furthermore, the
court stated that the parties' course of conduct showed that they
did not intend to include those travel agencies.27 On appeal to
the Eighth Circuit, the court affirmed the district court's hold-
ing defining "United States" as only the fifty states, thus exclud-
ing Puerto Rican and U.S. Virgin Islands travel agents from the
distribution of funds.28
The interpretation of the settlement agreement is reviewed de
novo and is guided by the "general rules of contract construc-
tion. 29 Under the rules of contract construction, the court will
presume that the parties intended all of the contract's language
to have effect and thus will avoid an interpretation that would
"render a provision meaningless.""° Moreover, the court will at-
tempt to harmonize all clauses of the contract and view it as a
whole, giving effect to the parties' intent." The court will read
the terms in the entire contract and will not construe them to
"lead to a harsh and absurd result. 32
In ascertaining the parties' intent, the court gives language its
natural, common sense meaning, considering the nature and
purpose of the agreement.33 If a written agreement is ambigu-
24 The district court also ordered the cy pres distribution requested by liaison
class counsel. Id. at 624.
25 Id. at 622.
26 Id.
27 Id.
28 However, the Eighth Circuit found that the district court abused its discre-
tion in ordering the cy pres distribution and subsequently found that the "next
best class" to receive the funds was the excluded agents in Puerto Rico and the
U.S. Virgin Islands. Id. at 623.
29 Gilbert v. Monsanto Co., 216 F.3d 695, 700 (8th Cir. 2000).
30 Chergosky v. Crosstown Bell, Inc., 463 N.W.2d 522, 526 (Minn. 1990).
31 Art Goebel, Inc. v. N. Suburban Agencies, Inc., 567 N.W.2d 511, 515 (Minn.
1997); Chergosky, 463 N.W.2d at 526.
32 Brookfield Trade Ctr., Inc. v. County of Ramsey, 584 N.W.2d 390, 394
(Minn. 1998).
33 In re Popkin & Stern v. Blackwell, 196 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 1999).
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ous, the parties' intent becomes relevant in the agreement's in-
terpretation.3 4 A contract is ambiguous if it is "reasonably
susceptible of more than one interpretation. '3 5 Determining
whether a contract is ambiguous is a question of law and de-
pends upon the meaning assigned to the "words or phrases in
accordance with the apparent purpose of the contract."36
The term "United States" has several different meanings and
uses.3 7 Under the Federal Aviation Act, "United States" is de-
fined as "the States of the United States, the District of Colum-
bia, and the territories and possessions of the United States."38
Under certain sections of the United States Code, the term
"United States" specifically means the continental United States,
District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, Guam, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands.3 9 Additionally, the United States "may be merely the
name of a sovereign occupying the position analogous to that of
other sovereigns in the family of nations. '"40 Moreover, it also
may "designate the territory over which the sovereignty of the
United States extends, or it may be the collective name of the
states which are united by and under the Constitution."41 Al-
though Puerto Rico has been cited for its unique status as a
commonwealth, Puerto Rico has been defined as a state for pur-
poses of the Sherman Antitrust Act.42
34 Michalski v. Bank of Am. Arizona, 66 F.3d 993, 996 (8th Cir. 1995).
35 Id. at 996; Brookfield Trade Ctr., 584 N.W.2d at 394; Art Goebel, 567 N.W.2d at
515.
36 Art Goebel, 567 N.W.2d at 515.
37 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 671 (1945), overruled on other
grounds by Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1985).
38 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a) (41) (2002).
39 26 U.S.C. § 7701(b)(11) (2002); 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (38) (2002) ("continen-
tal United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico, Guam and the Virgin Islands of the
United States"); 2 U.S.C. § 60(e) (2002) ("the term 'State' means any of the sev-
eral States, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or any
other territory or possession of the United States"); 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (i) (2002)
("includes a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the
Virgin Islands, American Samoa, Guam, the Canal Zone, and Outer Continental
Shelf Lands defined in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act"); 7 U.S.C.
§ 1561 (a) (1) (2002) ("the several States, District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico").
See also Brief for Appellants at 21, In Re: Am. Soc'y of Travel Agents v. United
Airlines, Inc., available at http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/briefs/00/ 10/appellant/
003086_lbr.pdf?Al=view+Brief (last visited Mar. 1, 2004) [hereinafter Brief].
40 Hooven & Allison Co., 324 U.S. at 671.
41 Id.
42 Romero v. United States, 38 F.3d 1204, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 1994); Cordova &
Simonpietri Ins. Agency, Inc. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A., 649 F.2d 36, 41 (1st
Cir. 1981).
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The Eighth Circuit's conclusion in American Society of Travel
Agents v. United Airlines, Inc., which upheld the district court's
denial of clarification, was improper. Even though the settle-
ment may ultimately render some benefit to the excluded agen-
cies, the contract's interpretation was misguided.43 The court
should have held the definition to be ambiguous and thus relied
on the parties' intent to clarify that Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands were included, or if the court had found the defi-
nition was unambiguous, realized that an ordinary definition of
"United States" does not exist and then, again, turned to the
parties' intent.
The court's interpretation was misguided for several reasons.
First, it would be reasonable to believe that the definition in the
settlement agreement was ambiguous. Numerous definitions of
"United States" have been found, reasonably allowing for more
than one interpretation of the term.44 Furthermore, the court
only addresses one way to interpret the addition of "continental"
to "United States" when there is clearly more than one way to do
so while still giving effect to the entire contract.45 For example,
the additional reference to "United States" may have simply
been for clarification, and was not necessarily made to exclude
those locations not mentioned in the first reference. Therefore,
the court was not limited to its determination that the first refer-
ence was to the location of class members while the second was
simply to the location of the affected travel.46 There is nothing
the court cites which supports the holding that the location of
the class members and the location of travel were not intended
to be the same.
Even if the district court correctly identified the settlement as
unambiguous, the court misinterpreted the nature of that clarity
because the language of the agreement makes clear that the par-
ties intended to be bound by another definition. The broad
scope of the initial use of "United States" is noticeably con-
trasted with the addition of "continental" in the next sentence
of the class definition. Clearly, the settlement did not mean to
exclude Hawaii and Alaska from the definition of United States
by singling them out in the next sentence. The second refer-
43 See Michalski, 66 F.3d at 996.
44 See supra notes 38 and 39.
45 The class definition first uses only the "United States," but later refers to the
"continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Is-
lands." See Travel Agents, 268 F.3d at 622.
46 Id.
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ence was simply drawing attention to the breadth of the first
reference. The court's holding that the second definition is dif-
ferent from the first makes little sense and thus construes the
contract without common sense, leading to a "harsh and absurd
result.
47
Moreover, agents in Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands
were severely handicapped by the reduction in commissions,
and to exclude them from settlement does not further the inter-
ests of justice. It seems extremely unlikely that an organization
that represents Puerto Rican and U.S. Virgin Island travel agents
would choose to exclude them in the requisite suit addressing
their harm. It would be a non sequitur to hold that ASTA did
not intend to include them, when ASTA represents them.48 The
inclusion of Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands with the
continental United States, Alaska, and Hawaii is implied in the
definition, and the class certification unambiguously includes
them.
Finally, the Supreme Court has long acknowledged numerous
meanings for "United States. '49 To force a definition into a set-
tlement agreement negotiated by parties who have a clear idea
of what definition is to be used is both impossible and illogical.
Here, the class definition was part of a settlement among air
travel industry professionals, and there is no reason to doubt
that the parties intended to use the definition under which their
industry normally operates. If it was critical to use an "ordinary"
definition, then the definition of United States under the Sher-
man Act should have been employed, which would have, at min-
imum, included the agents of Puerto Rico.5"
The court's exclusion of the affected agencies will be of great
consequence. Reduction in travel agent commissions are occur-
ring throughout the world, numerous agencies are being forced
to close their doors, and any relief that could be offered by the
courts in pursuit of the airlines' monopolistic ventures has been
unyielding. 1 Moreover, the holding of this court indicates that
even when the parties intend for a term to be interpreted a cer-
tain way, such intent can be completely ignored by the court.
47 Brookfield Trade Ctr., 584 N.W.2d at 394. See also Brief, supra note 39.
48 See Brief, supra note 39.
49 Hooven & Allison Co., 324 U.S. at 671.
50 See Romero, 38 F.3d at 1208; Cordova & Simonpietri Ins. Agency, 649 F.2d at 41.
51 See Travel Agents, 268 F.3d at 621-22; Turicentro, S.A. v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
2002 WL 31008819 (3d Cir. Pa. Sept. 9, 2002) (denying jurisdiction to Latin
American agents on the basis of U.S. cuts).
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While ultimately, the Puerto Rican and U.S. Virgin Island agen-
cies will receive some portion of the settlement, to deny the in-
tent of those that certified the class in the interpretation of the
agreement is far from the purpose of the judicial system.
Although the ultimate outcome is nearly identical under ei-
ther this note's reasoning or that of the court's since settlement
funds were distributed to the excluded agents, the court's misin-
terpretation raises a broader concern of the definition of terms
in class actions and the power of those included in the class to
represent the rights of all those involved. There is no question
that ASTA represented travel agents in Puerto Rico and the U.S.
Virgin Islands, and by that representation, it clearly intended for
them to be included when the class was certified. Both the lan-
guage and underlying spirit of the class definition were expan-
sive in an effort to reach all travel agencies affected by the
commission caps, including those members of the ASTA in Pu-
erto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Nevertheless, the court
blatantly disregarded the parties' intent, and such an action un-
dermines the ability for class action suits to adjudicate the rights
of its members.
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